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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The aim of this paper is to re-examine one of the most controversial theo-
ries in international economics- the purchasing power parity (hereafter PPP) -
for developing and developed countries, by using recent advances in the econo-
metrics of non-stationary dynamic panel methods. The PPP in its diﬀerent
versions relates the nominal exchange rate between any two currencies and the
relative price levels in the respective countries. The implication is that a country
with a higher inﬂation than its trading partner will tend to have a depreciat-
ing currency. Although this theory is often not empirically supported by data
and although its relevance as a benchmark to describe the long term behavior
of the real exchange rate has been questioned, the PPP has continued to be
pervasive in macroeconomic models. The PPP is implicit and also explicit in
many exchange rate determination models, and is also used as a yardstick of
the openness of an economy in macro-economic models. On the policy front,
PPP based benchmarks have been used to assess levels of exchange rates in a
bid to establish the need, extent and direction of adjustment.
Very recently the debate on the question of the PPP validity in the long-
run has re-emerged mainly in developed countries (see for instance Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba, 1996; Obstfeld and Taylor, 1996; Pedroni, 1995; Taylor, 1996).
According to the numerous reviews of literature on this subject, this renewal
of interest for the PPP is essentially due to three factors: (1) the necessity to
reinterpret the PPP theory, (2) the availability of long time series, and (3) the
development of panel data econometrics (cf. notably Breuer, 1994; Froot and
Rogoﬀ, 1995; Rogoﬀ, 1996).
These works also indicate that the interaction between these three factors has
produced some stylized facts of the real exchange rate behavior in developed
countries: (1) the hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows a random walk
is strongly rejected by data in the long run, (2) the real exchange rate tends
to return to its equilibrium level as deﬁned by the PPP although we observe
persistent PPP deviations (Wei and Parsley, 1995), (3) the weak PPP (i.e. the
2existence of a long-run relationship between the nominal exchange rate and
relative price levels) is generally empirically accepted, (4) with the exception
of the yen / $ exchange rate, there are no permanent deviations of the real
exchange rate with regard to the PPP which can be explained by structural
factors, such as the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect.
In this paper we use recent advances in the econometrics of non-stationary
dynamic panel methods to examine the relevance of the PPP concept as an
equilibrium real exchange rate determinant in developing countries. Our econo-
metric methodology rests upon the panel data integration tests proposed by
Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) and on the panel data cointegration tests recently
developed by Pedroni (1997, 1999, 2000, 2001). We consider a sample of 73
developing countries classiﬁed according to three criteria (the development level
and the geographic zone, the nature of the exchange rate regime, the level of
inﬂation) and we analyze whether the economic speciﬁcities have an inﬂuence
or not on the long-run the real exchange rate behavior. This allows us to draw
more general conclusions on the robustness of the PPP. As a comparison we
also introduce a group of developed countries. Our study is justiﬁed for at least
3r e a s o n s:
• First of all, there only exists few works on developing countries that use
the recent advances in the econometrics of non-stationary dynamic panel
methods in comparison with the studies on developed ones, and these
works do not always lead to clear conclusions concerning the validity or
not of the PPP. Indeed, the choice of the period of study, the countries
and the price indices largely condition the empirical results. Nagayasu
(1998), for instance, empirically conﬁrmed by applying the cointegration
tests of Pedroni’s (1995) the semi-strong form of the PPP for 16 African
countries using annual data covering the 1981-1994 period. Holmes (2000
) found by applying the unit root test of Im and al (1997) to a sample
group of 27 African countries on quarterly data covering the 1974-1997
period that the PPP is veriﬁed for countries with high inﬂation.
3• Then, the economic speciﬁcities of developing countries make us think
that the real exchange rate characteristics of these countries can diﬀer
from those of developed countries, whose regularities have recently been
put in evidence in literature (cf. infra).
• Finally, the recent developments of panel data econometrics (cf. notably
Pedroni, 1997, 1999, 2000, and 2001) now allow us to remedy the low power
of the conventional time series econometric techniques in small samples
and hence to obtain more robust results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section
we describe the theoretical relatio n s h i p st ob et e s t e da sw e l la st h eﬁeld of our
study ( the choice of countries, indicators, the sample period). In section 3 we
expose the panel data unit root tests and panel cointegration methodology that
will be used in the empirical application. In section 4 we report and comment
our econometric results for a panel of 73 developing and developed countries.
A ﬁnal section reviews the main ﬁndings. Two main results emerged from our
analysis. First, the PPP does not seem relevant to characterize the long-run
behavior of the real exchange rate in most developing countries. Second, the
PPP is more easily accepted in countries with high inﬂation than with low one,
but the nature of the exchange rate regime doesn’t condition its validity.
2 The theoretical relationships to be tested and
the ﬁeld of the study
The PPP hypothesis is usually expressed by a long-run relationship between
the nominal exchange rate and the relative price levels. Under the strong PPP,
the cointegration coeﬃcient between the nominal exchange rate and the relative
price levels is equal to one, while under the weak PPP, the two variables are
cointegrated but the cointegrating vector can diﬀer from unity. In this second
case, an equilibrium mechanism may exist assuring a symmetric movement of
the two variables, but the diﬀerences in the construction of price indices, the
4transaction costs (distance) and many other nuisance factors can lead to a non-
unitary relationship1. Given that the cointegrating vector between the nominal
exchange rate and the relative price levels is unitary, the strong PPP can be
investigated by testing whether the real exchange rate is stationary or not. The
presence of a unit root will imply that the PPP does not hold in the long run. On
the other hand the weak PPP holds if the nominal exchange rate and the relative
price levels are cointegrated independently of the cointegrating vector nature.
We therefore consider two levels of quantitative evaluation of this hypothesis in
a long-run perspective :
• at a ﬁrst level, it is investigated by testing whether the real exchange rate
logarithm is stationary or not,
• at a second level, we test if the variable
et − α − β(pt − p∗
t) is stationary or not, where α and β are constant
parameters which can diﬀer between countries, et being the logarithm of
the nominal exchange rate , pt the logarithm of the domestic prices and
p∗
t the logarithm of foreign prices.
Besides, many applied works show that the PPP validity largely depends on
the sample groups of countries considered, the period of study, as well as the
type of data used. The PPP would be more easily accepted for developed coun-
tries than for developing ones, especially for the posterior 1973 period, when
the Bretton Woods System ended. Moreover, some works reveal that certain
econometric results can be explained by the exchange rate regime instability.
Rogoﬀ (1996) noticed that the problem of the exchange rate regime instabil-
ity related to the use of long time series strongly conditioned the econometric
results. Besides, Mussa (1986) indicated that the real exchange rate volatility
depended on the exchange rate regime adopted. Furthermore, certain studies
show that the PPP is more likely to hold in opened countries with low inﬂation.
Indeed, countries with high inﬂation generally suﬀer from an exchange rate in-
stability and constitute ap r i o r igood examples of PPP refutation. On the other
1See for instance Fisher and Park (1991) or Taylor (1988).
5hand, other works conﬁrm, that given the predominancy of nominal shocks in
economies with high inﬂation, PPP deviations tend to reduce quicker than in
economies with low inﬂation. In addition, Froot and Rogoﬀ (1995) stressed that
nothing guarantees that the weak PPP holds in low inﬂation countries because
real shocks can modify the goods relative prices.
T h e s ec o n c l u s i o n sa r es t i l lt h eo bj e c to f debate and very few empirical studies
have been done. Furthermore, it seems diﬃcult to verify if at least a part of
these results is not actually due to the low power of the conventional econometric
methods in small samples. The recent developments of panel data integration
and cointegration techniques allow us henceforth to bridge up this gap and to
re-assess the validity of the PPP concept for developing countries.
In addition to these theoretical considerations, panel data integration and
cointegration techniques require a minimum of homogeneity to lead to robust
conclusions. This is the reason why we decompose our sample of 73 countries
into several homogeneous sub-groups. Three criteria were chosen to operate this
classiﬁcation2 :
• ﬁrstly, the level of development and the geographic zone: our study deals
with ﬁve groups of developing countries3: Africa, Latin America, Asia, the
Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, Central and Oriental
Europe countries (PECO) and a group of developed countries (OECD).
• secondly, the type of exchange rate regime: We classiﬁed countries in two
groups, those with a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ea n dt h o s ew i t ham o r eo r
less ﬂexible one 4.
• thirdly, the inﬂation level : Two groups of countries were thus deﬁned,
2As most countries composing our sample are strongly opened to international trade, we
do not proceed to a decomposition according to the openness degree.
3The list of countries considered in our empirical investigation is provided in the appendix.
4Countries with intermediate and ﬂexible exchange rate regimes are classiﬁed together.
The grouping of countries also takes the exchange rate regime stability for a given period
into account. Hence, we decomposed the period into two sub-periods from 1970 to 1983 and
from 1990 to 1997. The countries for which the exchange rate regime is strongly unstable
are excluded from the sample. For the ﬁrst sub-period the countries classiﬁcation is made
according to an index that we calculated. For the second sub-period we referred to the work
of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999).
6those with a low inﬂation level and those with a high inﬂation one5.
T h es a m p l ep e r i o dd i ﬀers according to the group of countries and accord-
ing to the indicator of the real exchange rate considered. Two indicators
of the real exchange rate were used :
1. the multilateral real exchange rate with regard to the main trading part-
ners (eﬀective real exchange rate).
2. the bilateral real exchange rate deﬁned as the ratio of domestic consump-
tion prices and the stock prices in the United States.
This choice of price indices is related to the two well-known PPP approaches.
On the one side, if we consider an approach in terms of the law of one price, it
seems preferable to retain stock prices because they take better tradable goods
into account. However, the absence of data for stock prices in developing coun-
tries constrained us to only retain consumption prices. This real exchange rate
indicator is perfectly in accordance with the conventional theoretical models
where the real exchange rate is deﬁned as the ratio of the tradable and non-
tradable goods prices. Indeed, it is generally admitted that consumption prices
contain more non-tradable goods than stock price indices. On the other hand,
if we conceive the PPP in the currency quantitative theory view, it is better to
retain the consumer price index. The exchange variations are then connected to
those of the currency purchasing power. We then use the eﬀective real exchange
rate, because it represents better by construction the various trading partners.
Note that we consider various real exchange rate indicators because the point
here is not to take part in the debate on the PPP concept and conﬁrm a par-
5Countries are assumed with a high inﬂa t i o nr a t ew h e nt h ea v e r a g ep r i c e sv a r i a t i o ne x c e e d s
10 % by years. In that case we also selected countries according to the inﬂation level stability
for the period. The countries for which the inﬂation level has strongly varied during the period
were excluded from the sample. We proceeded as follows: we decomposed our period of study
into two sub-periods, 1970-1989 and 1990-1997 and calculated the average level of inﬂation
for each period. The countries for which the average inﬂation has considerably varied between
the two sub-periods were excluded from the sample. Only the countries which have a stability
of their average inﬂation level between the two sub-periods were taken into account.
7ticular approach. Our objective consists on the contrary in testing the validity
of the PPP whatever the notion from which it comes from.
It remains to add, as indicated by Levin and Lin (1993)6 that working with
panel data on groups of countries which are more or less homogeneous poses
the problem of the interdependence between countries reﬂecting the presence
of common factors (due for instance to the fact that all the nominal exchange
rates are expressed with regard to the dollar). This phenomenon of interde-
pendence between countries aﬀects the test results and the estimated long-run
coeﬃcients. Indeed, O Connell (1998) showed that the PPP tests which ignore
this phenomenon suﬀer from important distortions. Consequently, tests are here
implemented both on the unadjusted and adjusted data7.
The series of eﬀective real exchange rate are extracted from the French data-
base of the CEPII and cover the 1964-1998 period. The series of consumption
and stock prices indices, the nominal exchange rate (expressed in dollar) are
extracted from the CHELEM data base of the CEPII and cover the 1970-1998
period except for Africa where, due to the lack of data, it only concerns the
1983-1998 period. For the PECO, the price and nominal exchange rate series
are quarterly and span the 1990:1-1998:4 period. Data are obtained from the
OECD data base, from the World data base on transition countries (WIIW) and
from national ﬁnancial statistics. The real exchange rate is expressed with re-
gard to the DM given the importance of the trading exchange of these countries
with Germany.
3 The non-stationary dynamic panel economet-
ric methodology
Before the development of econometric techniques adapted to non-stationary
dynamic panels, previous studies on panel data implicitly supposed that the
6” Since the removal of cross - section averages from the dated does not aﬀect the limiting
distributions of the sample group unites root and cointegration test statistics, this step should
be performed unless there are strong a priori reasons to expect the unadjusted dated to be
independent across individuals ”, Levin and lin (1993).
7The adjustment is made by deducting for each serie at each date the average of the group.
8variables used were stationary. This constitutes a serious limitation to their
results given the considerable bias existing in this case on the parameter esti-
mates when the non-stationarity properties of data are not taken into account.
Due to the recent developments of econometrics, it is henceforth possible to test
stationarity on panel data as well as the degree of integration of set of variables.
We now present the panel unit root tests and panel cointegration tests that we
will use in the empirical application reported in section 4.
3.1 Panel unit root tests
Initial methodological work on non-stationary panels focused on testing unit
roots in univariate panels. Quah (1994) derived standard normal asymptotic
distributions for testing unit roots in homogeneous panels as both time series and
cross sectional dimension grow large. Levin and Lin (1993) derived distributions
under more general conditions that allow for heterogeneous ﬁxed eﬀects and
time trend. More recently, Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997), studied the small
properties of unit root tests in panels with heterogeneous dynamics and proposed
alternative tests based on the mean of individual unit-root statistics. In this
paper we shall apply Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) unit-root test (called IPS
after) since it is more powerful than those of Quah (1994) and Levin and Lin
(1993) used in existing studies.
Levin and Lin’s test is considered as more general than those of Quah since
it explicitly takes heterogeneity and correlation between units into account.
However as shown by Papell (1997) it suﬀers from size distortion without being
able to correct serial correlation adequately. Using Monte Carlo simulations, he
showed that the ﬁnite sample critical values are greater than those in Levin and
Lin (1993). For quarterly data, the critical values are 11% higher (on average)
than those reported by Levin and Lin and for monthly data, they are 3% higher.
The test proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) permits to solve Levin
and Lin’s serial correlation problem in assuming heterogeneity between units in
a dynamic panel framework. Furthermore as shown by Im and al via Monte
Carlo simulations it has higher power than that of Levin and Lin. IPS (1997)
9proposed two statistics : a Maximum Likelihood Statistics, called Lbar, and a
Student statistic tb. These two statistics are based on individual Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions. Since an appropriate ADF regression will
correct the serial correlation in data, the IPF panel unit-root test takes care of
serial correlation automatically. In our empirical work of section 4 we shall use
the tb statistic instead of the Lbar one since IPS’s Monte Carlo experiments
have shown that it is the more powerful even for a value of N inferior to 5. This
statistic can be expressed as :
tb =
√
N(tNT − E(tT)
p
Va r(tT)
where tNT = 1
N
N P
i=1
tiT is an average of the t individual student statistic in a
conventional time series unit-root analysis, EtT and V (tT) are respectively the
mean and variance of tiT under the null hypothesis that the series are integrated
of order one with N→∞ .
IPS show that under the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, the tb statistic
follows the standard normal distribution asymptotically.
3.2 Panel cointegration tests
In the empirical application we shall apply Pedroni’s cointegration test
methodology (1995a, 1997 and 1999) to analyze the Balassa-Samuelson hypoth-
esis. Pedroni (1995a) studied the properties of spurious regressions and tests
for cointegration in heterogeneous panels and derived appropriate distributions
for these cases. These allow us to test for the presence of long run equilib-
ria in multivariate panels while permitting the dynamic and even the long run
cointegrating vectors to be heterogeneous across individual members. Like the
IPS panel unit-root test, the panel cointegration tests proposed by Pedroni also
take heterogeneity into account using speciﬁc parameters which of course are
allowed to vary across individual members of the sample. Pedroni (1997 and
1999) derived the asymptotic distributions and explored the small sample per-
formances of seven diﬀerent statistics to test panel data cointegration. Of these
10seven statistics, four are based on pooling along, which is often referred to as the
Within dimension (called “panel” after), and the last three are based on the Be-
tween dimension (called “group” after). These diﬀerent statistics are based on a
model that assumes that cointegration relationships are heterogeneous between
individual members and are deﬁned as :
For the Within statistics
Zw
ρ =(
N X
i=1
T X
t=1
L
−2
11iˆ e2
it−1)−1
N X
i=1
T X
t=1
L
−2
11i(ˆ eit−1∆ˆ eit − b λi):Panel Rho_stat
Zw
t =( e s∗2
NT
N X
i=1
T X
t=1
L
−2
11iˆ e∗2
it−1)−1/2
N X
i=1
T X
t=1
L
−2
11i(ˆ e∗
it−1∆ˆ e∗
it):Panel Adf_stat
Zw
pp =( e σ
2
N X
i=1
T X
t=1
L
−2
11iˆ e2
it−1)−1/2
N X
i=1
T X
t=1
L
−2
11i(ˆ eit−1∆ˆ eit − b λi):Panel PP_stat
Zw
v =(
N X
i=1
T X
t=1
L
−2
11iˆ e2
it−1)−1 : Panel V_stat
For the Between statistics
ZB
ρ =
N X
i=1
(
T X
t=1
ˆ e2
i,t−1)−1
T X
t=1
(ˆ eit−1∆ˆ eit − b λi):Group Rho_stat
ZB
t =
N X
i=1
(b σ
2
i
T X
t=1
ˆ e2
i,t−1)−1
T X
t=1
((ˆ eit−1∆ˆ eit − b λi):Group Adf_stat
ZB
pp =
N X
i=1
Ã
T X
t=1
b s∗2ˆ e∗2
it−1
!−1 T X
t=1
(ˆ e∗
it−1∆ˆ e∗
it):Group PP_stat
with,
b λ = 1
T
ki P
s=1
(1 − s
ki+1)
t P
t=s+1
b µitb µit−s,
11b s2
i = 1
T
t P
t=s+1
b µ
2
it, b σ
2 = s2
i +2 b λi,
e σi = b s2
i +2 b λi,
e σ
2
NT
1
T
N P
i=1
b L
−2
11ib σ
2
i,
b s∗2
i = 1
T
t P
t=s+1
b µ
∗2
it , e s∗2
NT = 1
T
t P
t=s+1
b s∗2
it , b L2
11i
T P
t=1
b η
2
it+ 2
T
ki P
s=1
(1− s
ki+1)
T P
i=1
b ηitb ηit−s
and where the residuals are extracted from the above regressions :
b eit = b ρb eit−1 + b uit,
b eit = b ρb eit−1 +
Ki P
k=1
b γik∆b eit−k + b uit,
∆yit =
M P
m=1
b bmi∆Xmit + b ηit,
Note that in the above writings Li represents the ith component of the
Cholesky decomposition of the residual Variance-Covariance matrix , b λ and
e σ
2
NT are two parameters used to adjust the autocorrelation in the model, σi
and s2
i are the contemporaneous and long-run individual variances.
Pedroni has shown that the asymptotic distribution of these seven statistics
can be expressed as :
χNT − µ
√
N
√
v
→ N(0,1)
where χNT is the statistic under consideration among the seven proposed, N
and T are the sample parameter values and µ and ν are parameters tabulated
in Pedroni (1999).
In terms of power Pedroni (1997) showed that for values of T larger than 100,
all the proposed seven statistics do fairly well and are quite stable. However for
smaller samples (T inferior to 20) the Group ADF-Statistic (non-parametric) is
the most powerful, followed by the Panel v-Statistic and the Panel rho-Statistic.
For this reason, only the group ADF-statistic will be considered in our study for
panel cointegration testing. The ﬁnite sample distribution for the seven statistics
were tabulated by Pedroni (1997) via Monte Carlo simulations. The calculated
12test statistics must be larger (in absolute value) than the tabulated critical value
to reject the null hypothesis of the absence of cointegration.
4 The econometric investigation of the PPP for
a panel of 73 developing and developed coun-
tries
4.1 PPP, development level and geographic zone
4.1.1 Tests of the strong PPP
In addition to the conventional ADF tests applied to individual series (cf.
table 3 in the appendix), we have implemented the panel data unit-root test
proposed by Im, Peseran and Shin (1997) to examine the integratedness degree
of our series. Tests are carried out on two types of speciﬁcations: with constant
and with constant and determinist trend8. The results of these panel data tests
for the original and adjusted series of the two real exchange rate indicators are
reported in the table below9 :
8It is important to note that the existence of a trend in the real exchange rate series is
a violation of the traditional PPP form such as it has been deﬁned by Cassel (1922). The
results of these tests on adjusted data which do not integrate a trend are more adequate.
9The critical value is 1.65. The null hypothesis of unit-root is rejected by data if the
calculated statistic is larger than the 5% critical value.
13Table : Panel data unit-root tests (IPS, 1997)
Unadjusted data Adjusted data N
CC + TC C + T
Bilateral exchange rate
Africa -3.67 -0.41 -1.13 1.62 13
Latin America -1.37 -0.74 -1.37 -0.74 16
Asia -1.87 -1.32 -1.51 -0.77 9
MENA 1.26 2.04 2.10 0.68 6
PECO 1.43 2.32 -1.63 1.33 12
OECD -3.30 -0.83 -3.30 -0.83 20
Multilateral real exchange rate
Africa -0.38 -0.93 0.19 -0.40 13
Latin America -3.15 -3.16 -3.06 -2.76 19
Asia -1.51 -0.77 -2.34 -0.27 9
MENA -0.24 1.56 0.57 0.35 6
PECO
OECD -1.25 -3.69 -3.45 -3.18 22
For Africa and for the two real exchange rate indicators, individual unit-
root tests don’t reject in most cases the null-hypothesis of non-stationarity,
even though the sample small size does not permit to have information about
the power of the tests (cf. table 3 in the appendix). For the ﬁrst speciﬁcation
(with constant), individual tests reject the unit-root hypothesis for 5 countries
out of 13, whatever the indicator of the real exchange rate is. The results of the
panel data unit-root test conﬁrm those of the individual tests and indicate that
the hypothesis of real exchange rate stationarity cannot be accepted. Globally,
the tests carried out on the adjusted series conﬁrm the results obtained on the
unadjusted data, except for the bilateral exchange rate and when we suppose a
model with a constant. Indeed, tests reject the null-hypothesis of unit-root for
the unadjusted series and accept it for the adjusted series.
Concerning Latin America, the individual tests results are very close to those
of African countries in sofar as real exchange appears in most cases as a non-
stationary variable. The hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected in only 7
countries out of 19 for the multilateral exchange rate, and in 3 countries out
of 16 for the bilateral real exchange rate. On the other hand, panel data tests
conﬁrm the non-stationarity hypothesis when working with the bilateral real
14exchange rate, and reject it for the eﬀe c t i v ee x c h a n g er a t e .T h er e s u l t sa r en o t
modiﬁe db yt h et y p eo fd a t au s e d .
For Asia, the results of the panel data unit-root test depend on the type of
data considered. Indeed, for the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (with constant) and using
unadjusted data, we conclude that the bilateral real exchange rate is stationary
whereas the multilateral exchange rate is not. We ﬁnd an opposite result for
the adjusted data. For the second speciﬁcation (with constant and trend) tests
indicate that bilateral and multilateral real exchange rates are integrated of or-
der 1 whether we consider the unadjusted or adjusted data. Tests on individual
data are not in accordance with the panel data unit-root test since for the two
indicators, the hypothesis of non-stationarity is strongly accepted.
Similar results are found for the PECO, since individual tests reveal that
for the whole group of countries the hypothesis of non-stationarity of the real
exchange rate is accepted. The panel data unit-root test leads to the same
conclusion and support the non-stationarity of the real exchange rate at a 5%
level of signiﬁcance.
The individual unit-root test results conﬁrm the non-stationarity of the bi-
lateral real exchange rate and of the eﬀe c t i v ee x c h a n g er a t ef o rt h e6M E N A
countries. However, the panel data unit-root tests show that for the model
with constant, the bilateral exchange rate is integrated of order one for the un-
adjusted data and stationary for the adjusted series. We get opposite results
for the model with a trend. However, we obtain more robust results for the
multilateral exchange rate. Indeed, independently of the type of data used and
whatever the speciﬁcation chosen is, tests clearly indicate that the real exchange
rate is integrated of order 1.
For developed countries, results reveal that for the unadjusted data the ef-
fective exchange rate is stationary, whereas the bilateral exchange rate is inte-
grated. However, applied to adjusted data, the tests conﬁrm the stationarity
of the real exchange rate for both indicators. The panel data unit-root tests
contradict individual tests and indicate that generally the real exchange rate is
stationary. Consequently, it seems that individual tests suﬀer from low power
15and are unable to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in small samples.
These empirical elements in favour of the PPP in developed countries can be
explained by low transaction costs (distance), the absence of tariﬀ barriers and
the relative stability of the adopted trade policies. These results are identical
to those found in the previous studies of literature, which generally conﬁrm the
PPP for developed economies.
To conclude, the panel data unit-root tests implemented in this sub-section
generally conﬁrm the PPP for developed countries. On the contrary, for devel-
oping countries the strong PPP is not veriﬁed. This result indicates on the one
hand that the price convergence process between developing countries and their
trading partners is not yet ﬁnished, and on the other, that certain sources of
nuisance exist which prevent a full nominal exchange rate adaptation to price
variations. Taylor (1998) evoked transaction costs as a possible source of nui-
sance. Patel (1990) noticed that diﬀerences in the construction of price indices
between countries could also lead to the empirical rejection of the strong PPP.
Finally, Park (1991) considered that the productivity diﬀerential could induce a
non-unitary cointegration coeﬃcient between the nominal exchange rate and the
price ratio. However, the rejection of the strong PPP does not necessarily imply
that the ”weak” form is not veriﬁed. Indeed, it is important to underline that
panel data unit-root tests impose a unitary and homogeneous10 cointegration
coeﬃcient between the nominal exchange rate and the price ratio. But many
authors showed that, although an equilibrium relationship can exist between
these two variables, for a more general interpretation of the PPP (weak PPP),
it is not necessary that the coeﬃcient of cointegration should be equal to one.
Consequently, in the next sub-section we will pursue the analysis to examine
whether the weak PPP holds or not in developing countries.
10Actually panel data unit-root tests assume an average relationship for the whole sample
with a unitary cointegration coeﬃcient.
164.1.2 Tests of the PPP "weak" form
The test of the weak PPP consists in testing the existence of a cointegration
relation between the nominal exchange rate and the price ratio. The results of
the test of Pedroni’s cointegration (Group-adf-statistics are reported in table
2)11.
Table 2 : Panel data cointegration tests (Pedroni, 1997, 1999)
Africa Latin America Asia MENA PECO OECD
Group-adf-stat -1.37 -1.57 0.61 -3.21 -1.203 -4.38
Let us begin by noticing that, for the developed and MENA countries, the
weak PPP is veriﬁed12. Furthermore, tests on individual data (cf. table 5
in the appendix) show that for the majority of countries, the hypothesis of
cointegration cannot be rejected. This last result does not contradict the strong
PPP for that, but permits to account for the ambiguous results obtained by the
panel data unit-root tests.
However, the panel data cointegration tests indicate that the weak PPP is
rejected by data for Africa, Latin America, Asia and the PECO, which means
that in many developing countries, the PPP cannot be used as a benchmark to
determine the long-run evolution of the real exchange rate.
O nt h eb a s i so ft h ee c o n o m i cs p e c i ﬁcities of developing countries we can
evoke the following factors to justify these empirical results:
• Obstacles in international exchanges are likely to inﬂuence asymmetrically
relative prices by disrupting the spatial arbitrage. In fact, even though eco-
nomic liberalization seems to be the general tendency in most developing
countries, there still exits tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers in some countries
which limit free trade.
11The 5% critical value is 1.65. The null hypothesis of absence of a cointegration relationship
is rejected if the calculated statistic is larger than the critical value.
12This indicates the coherency between the results of this section and those of the previous
one, obtained with a diﬀerent econometric panel data method.
17• Inﬂationary anticipations exercise an upward pressure on domestic prices
with regard to foreign prices. In fact, most developing countries suﬀer from
a price instability often explained by inadequate monetary and budgetary
policies.
• Long-run capital movements can also provoke PPP deviations. Developing
countries can also have beneﬁted from important capital ﬂows in terms of
foreign direct investments. These capital ﬂows often entail a long-run real
exchange rate appreciation.
• Interventions on the exchange market can inﬂuence the value of the cur-
rency. Some countries are indeed brought to intervene on the exchange
market to face ﬂuctuations in exchange rates and hence strengthen their
export competitiveness.
• The modiﬁcations of relative prices reﬂecting structural changes in the
economy can induce exchange rate deviations with regard to the PPP. In
fact in the early 80s, most developing countries began important struc-
tural programs to restructure their economy. These eﬀorts of reorganiza-
tion permitted to liberalize prices while strengthening the export sector
competitiveness. Productivity gains obtained in the tradable goods sec-
tor entailed a decrease of their relative price and hence a continuous real
exchange rate appreciation (Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect).
The ﬁrst battery of tests implemented on the basis of a geographic decompo-
sition and of the development level showed that for most developing countries,
the PPP does not seem relevant to characterize the real exchange rate evolution
(with the exception of the MENA countries for the PPP "weak" form). The
economic speciﬁcities of the various geographic zones seem to play an impor-
tant role in the determination of the long-run real exchange rate behavior. We
investigate this possibility in the next sub-section.
184 . 2 P P P ,e x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e sa n di n ﬂation
As we have just seen it before,the level of development is not a suitable
criterion to assess the PPP relevance to characterize the long-run evolution of
the real exchange rate. Our aim in this sub-section is to identify other economic
speciﬁcities that could inﬂuence the real exchange rate behavior. The basic idea
is that the PPP tends to be more easily accepted in countries with high inﬂation
than in countries with low or medium ones. We also recognize a certain role to
the nature of the exchange rate regime in the determination of the real exchange
rate behavior. It is however important to notice that until now we do not have
enough empirical works at our disposal to conﬁrm these ideas. The rarity of
studies can be explained by the low power of conventional econometric methods
in small samples. But the recent development of panel data econometric tech-
niques now permit to re-examine this question and investigate whether these
theoretical intuitions are empirically veriﬁed.
We now proceed to a decomposition of our sample of countries according to
the relative ﬂexibility of the exchange rate regime and the inﬂation level. We
begin by examining the relationship between the exchange rate ﬂexibility and
PPP and we then come back on the eﬀect of inﬂation.
4.2.1 PPP and exchange rate regimes
Countries are classiﬁed in two subgroups: those with a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime and those with a ﬂoating exchange rate one. The nature and stability13
of the exchange rate regime during the period of study, which goes from 1970 to
1983 for the ﬁxed exchange rate regime and from 1990 to 1998 for the ﬂoating
exchange rate one, represent the classiﬁcation criteria of the various countries
of our sample. Only the countries for which the exchange rate regime is stable
during the period of study are included, the others are excluded from the sample,
which reduces the number of countries to 16 for the ﬁxed exchange rate regime
a n dt o3 5f o rt h eﬂexible one.
13We present in the appendix the classiﬁcation method of countries according to the ex-
change rate regime.
19The econometric method used in this sub-section rests upon Pedroni’s panel
data cointegration test (cf. Pedroni 1997, 1999, 2000) and also on the unitary
cointegration coeﬃcient tests recently developed by Pedroni. Indeed, Pedroni
(2001) made an extension of conventional panel data unit-root tests to test
constraints on the estimated cointegration coeﬃcients. The advantage of this
test in comparison to the unit-root tests previously used is that it is based
on the Fully Modiﬁed ordinary least squares (Fmols), which corrects possible
nuisances in small sized samples. Pedroni (2001) showed that this method lead
to more robust results when working with small sized samples (as it is precisely
t h ec a s eh e r e ) 14 than the Ordinary Least square (OLS) method. Besides, these
simulations indicate that the unit-root tests based on the OLS are biased in
small samples and wrongly too often reject the null hypothesis. The results of
tests are reported in table 3:
Table 3 : PPP and exchange rate regime
Fixed regime Flexible regime
strong PPP
Constant 6.98 -5.03
Constant + trend -1.23 7.05
weak PPP
Group—ADF-stat -1.87 -1.89
Number of observations 224 315
Panel data cointegration tests show that the strong PPP is empirically re-
jected for the two exchange rate regimes. We have also implemented panel data
unit-root tests and found that for the ﬂoating exchange rate regime, the strong
PPP holds independently of the adopted speciﬁcations (constant and constant
and trend). However, for the ﬁxed exchange rate regime the strong PPP is re-
jected for the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (without trend) and accepted for the second one
(with trend). Once again these results conﬁrm the superiority of Pedroni’s tests
(2001) with regard to the previous panel data unit-root tests. On the contrary,
the panel data cointegration tests conﬁrm the weak PPP for the two exchange
14The superiority of the Fmols method has been conﬁrmed by Philipps and Hansen (1990)
and Philipps (1995) on individual data.
20rate regimes15.
Oh (1996) found diﬀerent results and showed that in developing countries,
the PPP ”strong is accepted for the ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ep e r i o dw h e r e a si t
is rejected for the ﬂexible one. On the other hand, in developed countries, panel
data unit-root tests accept the non-stationarity of the real exchange rate for the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime period and reject it for the ﬂexible one. It is however
important to notice that we do not proceed in the same way to distinguish the
various exchange rate regimes. Indeed, Oh (1996) used a temporal decomposi-
tion: from 1960 to 1972, the exchange rate regime is supposed to be ﬂexible,
and from 1973 to 1989, it is supposed to be ﬁxed. However, in our analysis,
we tried to take a classiﬁcation with regard to a composite index into account,
which allows to distinguish the various exchange rate regimes on the basis of
the relative volatility of the nominal exchange rate and of the exchange reserves.
This way of proceeding permits to take what is eﬀectively the actual exchange
rate regime into account and not what is oﬃcially announced. Furthermore, to
limit the nuisances which can cause changes of exchange rate regimes with time,
we also took the exchange rate regime stability into account. The economet-
r i cm e t h o du s e dh e r ei sa l s od i ﬀerent because instead of carrying out unit-root
tests, we directly tested whether the cointegration coeﬃcient between the prices
of the economy and its trading partner, expressed in the same currency, is equal
or not to 1.
Hence it clearly emerges from our econometric investigations that the PPP
validity does not depend on the exchange rate regime. This is a useful and sig-
niﬁcant result as until today we did not have a clear answer to the relationships
between the nature of the exchange rate regime and the stochastic properties
of the real exchange rate, on the basis of the previous works of literature. In-
deed,according to Gulli and Kaminski (1991) the real exchange rate behavior
depends on the period of study and on the historic events rather than on the
current exchange rate regime. In other words, it is the nature of macroeconomic
15The cointegration tests consist in testing the existence of a long-run relationship between
domestic and foreign prices expressed in the same currency.
21shocks which aﬀect economy, as well as the stability of the exchange rate regime
with time which determine the long-run behavior of the exchange rate. Besides,
several empirical studied showed that between the early 80s and the early 90s,
the exchange rate regimes adopted, both by developing and developed countries
were not stable16. Countries had the concern to elaborate the best adapted ex-
change rate policy to an economic environment characterized with an increased
openness on the outside. These adaptation led economies to frequently change
their exchange rate policies. It is only from the 90s that we notice a relative
stability of exchange rate regimes in several countries. We therefore think that
the higher exchange rate volatility which characterized the posterior ”Breton
Woods” period can be explained by the exchange rate regime instability rather
than by its ﬂexibility. In fact, whether the exchange rate regime is ﬂexible
or ﬁxed, there always exists a combination of prices and of the nominal ex-
change rate which assures the long-run real exchange rate stability. In the ﬁxed
exchange rate regime with macroeconomic shocks, prices adjust themselves in
the long-run to maintain the real exchange rate stability. On the contrary, in
the ﬂoating exchange rate regime, both prices and nominal exchange rate adjust
themselves and a combination of the two can exist to assure the PPP. Finally, it
seems that it is more the low power of conventional econometric methods rather
than the exchange rate regime instability characterizing the periods of study
that accounts for the empirical rejection of the PPP obtained in the previous
studies of literature.
4.2.2 PPP and inﬂation
We now decompose our sample of countries according to the inﬂation level.
The countries in which the average level of inﬂation does not exceed 10 % are
classiﬁed as countries with low inﬂation, the others are classiﬁed as countries
with high inﬂation. Here again the stability of the inﬂation level during the
16Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenzgger (1999) classiﬁed the exchange regimes in a group of devel-
oping and developed countries according to an index of exchange volatility. Their analysis
reveals that most countries had to change several time of exchange regime during the period
of study.
22period of study is taken into account. We exclude from our sample the countries
in which the inﬂation rate has varied frequently during the period. In other
words, the countries which cannot be classiﬁed in one of the two groups for the
whole period of study are excluded from the analysis.
Table 4 : PPP and inﬂation
High inﬂation Low inﬂation
PPP "strong form"
Constant -1.51 2.60
Constant and trend -1.72 -4.31
PPP "weak form"
Group—ADF-stat 5.59 1.79
Number of observations 1190 665
The results of the panel data unit-root tests reveal that the strong PPP
is more often accepted in countries with high inﬂa t i o nt h a ni nc o u n t r i e sw i t h
low one. However, cointegration tests indicate that the weak PPP is as often
accepted in countries with high inﬂation as in countries with low one17.T h e s e
results are compatible with those of Holmes (2000) who found for a sample of
African countries that the strong PPP is more easily accepted in countries with
high inﬂation than for countries with low one. Besides, our results are in ac-
cordance with the theoretical predictions according to which the PPP is more
easily accepted in countries with high inﬂation. Indeed, in high inﬂation coun-
tries nominal shocks account for most part of the real exchange rate ﬂuctuations,
and consequently PPP deviations can only be temporary. Furthermore, an in-
ﬂationary environment favors spatial and temporal arbitrage, which strengthens
the convergence of prices between countries.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The attempts to test for the PPP pose numerous methodological problems.
If we consider the PPP basic versions, the real exchange rate should be con-
stant. That is why due to the important ﬂuctuations of real parities observed,
17Holmes (2001), Mahdavi and Zho (1994), Mc Nown and Wallace (1989) also conﬁrmed
that the PPA holds in countries with high inﬂation.
23the defenders of the PPP consider that this theory is only valid in the long-run,
because of very slow adjustment mechanisms. However, even at this horizon
few econometric studies found evidence in favor of the PPP. In particular, the
most recent works using time series econometric techniques for developed coun-
tries, generally stressed the real exchange rate non-stationarity, hence providing
empirical evidence against the PPP. The aim of this paper was to investigate
whether the PPP concept could serve as a benchmark to determine the real
exchange rate evolution in a large sample of developed and developing coun-
tries. The recent panel data integration and cointegration techniques have been
carried out to remedy the low power of conventional time series econometric
methods in small samples.
Our investigations indicate that the PPP strong form is veriﬁed for OECD
and MENA countries. However in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the PECO,
PPP does not seem relevant to characterize the long-run behavior of the real
exchange rate. A widening of our analysis ﬁeld shows on the one hand that the
nature of the exchange rate regime doesn’t condition the validity of the PPP
and on the other that the PPP is accepted more easily in countries with high
inﬂa t i o nt h a nw i t hl o wo n e .
Our study puts in evidence the absence of an equilibrium relationship be-
tween national prices, foreign prices and the exchange rate for developing coun-
tries, hence conﬁrming that the PPP theory is empirically rejected. This result
also conﬁrms that PPP deviations are permanent.
Apart from the problems of trade obstacles and price rigidity which char-
acterize most developing economies, the productivity shocks can also explain
the persistent deviations of exchange rates with regard to their equilibrium
level deﬁned with the PPP. According to the Balassa-Samuelson theory (1964),
the tradable sector productivity increase entails a long-run appreciation of the
real exchange rate and hence persistent PPP deviations. Besides the Balassa-
Samuelson eﬀect, other macroeconomic variables such as the terms of trade,
capital movements, public spending can also inﬂuence the real exchange rate
equilibrium level.
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Appendix 1 : Complete econometric test results  
 
1.  PPP, development level and geographic zone 
 
A) Tests of the strong PPP  
 
Table 1 : Stationarity tests of the real exchange rate  
                                          Bilateral rate
1              Multilateral rate
2  
      C                   C + T                     C                      C + T   
        AFRICA                                                      Individual tests
3 
Botswana  -2.34    (0)  -5.90***(3)  -0.95   (0)  -2.23    (0)   
Burundi  -3.05** (0)  -2.50    (0)  -3.11** (0)  -2.50    (0)   
Gambia  -4.04***(3)  -1.22    (0)  -4.28***(3)  -7.02***(3)   
Ghana  -1.08    (0)  -1.98    (0)  -1.01    (0)      -2.01    (0)   
Kenya   0.02    (0)  -1.90    (0)  -0.15    (0)  -2.05    (3)   
Malawi  -4.00***(3)  -2.8      (3)  -2.24    (3)  -2.79    (2)   
Niger  -1.55    (4)  -4.40***(2)  -5.09***(2)  -3.05    (2)   
Uganda  -1.51    (0)  -3.89** (4)  -1.49    (0)  -4.03** (4)   
RSA  -1.37    (0)  -1.23    (0)  -1.46    (0)  -1.27    (0)   
Sierra Leone  -3.58***(3)  -2.91    (3)  -1.76    (0)  -3.37** (3)   
Tanzania  -2.26    (0)  -2.33    (0)  -2.25    (0)  -2.33    (0)   
Zimbabwe  -4.98***(1)  -5.75***(4)  -3.04** (4)  -2.32    (0)   
Zambia  -1.43    (0)  -1.28    (0)  -3.33** (4)  -2.08    (4)   
                                                            Panel data unit-root test, Pedroni (1999, 1999,2000)                                                                          
                                                            Unadjusted Data   
  -3.67 -0.41  -0.38  -0.93   
                                                            Adjusted data
4  
  -1.13 1.62  0.19  -0.40   
       LATIN AMERICA                                   Individual tests l                                                     
Argentina  -1.97  (0)  -2.24  (0)  -1.84  (5)  -2.13  (5)   
Bolivia  -2.22  (0)  -2.26  (0)  -1.97  (0)  -1.81  (0)   
Brazil      -1.40  (0)  -2.22  (0)   
Chile  -2.11  (0)  -1.70  (0)  -2.14  (0)  -3.11* (1)   
Colombia  -2.69* (5)  -3.14  (5)  -2.80* (5)  -3.33* (5)   
Costa Rica  -2.22   (0)  -2.15  (0)  -3.27**(0)  -3.18* (0)   
El Salvador      0.02  (3)  -2.03  (3)   
Ecuador  -3.07**(2)  -2.98  (2)  -0.96  (0)  -1.30  (0)   
Guatemala  -1.87   (5)  -2.74  (3)  -2.93**(0)  -3.51  (1)   
Guyana  -0.46   (2)  -2.24  (2)  -0.66  (3)  -4.62***(0)   
Honduras  -2.39   (2)  -2.31  (0)  -2.38  (3)  -2.87  (3)   
Jamaica      -2.78  (1)  -3.19* (1)   
Mexico  -0.54   (0)  -2.78  (0)  -3.68***(1)  -3.78* (1)   
Nicaragua  -1.75   (0)  -2.25  (0)  -1.71  (1)  -1.88  (2)   
Panama  -1.18   (0)  -1.06  (0)  -3.09**  (5)  -3.24* (5)   
Paraguay  -2.05   (5)  -2.24  (0)  -1.93  (5)  -1.60  (5)   
Peru  -0.45   (0)  -1.58  (0)  -2.01  (0)  -2.16  (0)   
Uruguay  -0.99   (0)  -2.10  (0)  -2.65* (0)  -3.26* (2)   
Venezuela  -3.30**(0)  -3.15  (0)  -2.7* (0)  -2.51  (3)   
                                                             Panel data test
 5  
                                                            Unadjusted Data   
  -1.37 -0.74  -3.15  -3.16   
                                                             Adjusted data     
  -1.37 -0.74  -3.03  -2.76   
 
                                                 
1 It is the bilateral real exchange rate with respect to the United States and 
calculated on the basis of the consumption price index.. 
2 It is the multilateral exchange rate calculated with regard to the main trading 
partners. 
3 It is the conventional ADF unit-root test. The number of lags is in brackets. *, 
**, and *** indicate the real exchange rate stationarity respectively at the 10 %, 5 
% and 1 % levels. 
4 The data are corrected from the intra-group correlation.. 
5 The critical value is 1.65.  
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      ASIA                                                   Individual tests l                                                              
Korea  -1.88 (1)  -3.14 (1)  -1.52 (0)  -1.61 (0)   
Hong-Kong  -1.09 (1)  -0.48(1)  -0.80 (1)  -3.44*(3)   
India  .97 (1)  -4.52***(4)  -1.09 (3)  -2.77 (4)   
Indonesia  -0.87 (0)  -1.76 (1)  -0.59 (0)  -0.81 (0)   
Japan  -0.75 (4)  -2.98 (1)  -0.44 (4)  -1.49 (0)   
Malaysia  -1.54 (1)  -2.83 (1)  -1.57 (0)  -1.70 (0)   
The Philippines  -2.05 (0)  -2.61 (0)  -1.23 (2)  -3.60**(1)   
Singapore  -1.41 (3)  -2.10 (1)  -3.33**(0)  -2.85 (0)   
Thailand  -2.13 (3)  -2.17 (0)  -0.65 (0)  -3.06 (0)   
                                                                Panel data test                                                                 
                                                              Unadjusted Data   
  -1.87 -1.32  -1.41  -0.77  
                                                              Adjusted data   
  -1.51 -0.77  -2.34  -0.87  
      MENA               Individual tests                                                                                                
          
Algeria  -1.07 (0)  -1.66 (0)  -1.50 (3)          -1.19 (3)   
Egypt  -1.98 (1)  -2.62 (1)  -1.18 (1)         -2.44 (1)   
Jordan  -0.77 (0)  -1.13 (0)  -1.65 (0)         -0.59 (0)   
Morocco   0.59 (0)  -0.69 (0)  -2.58 (1)         -3.17 (1)   
Tunisia  -0.45 (0)  -1.56 (0)  -1.17 (0)         -1.75 (4)   
Turkey  -1.73 (0)  -1.73 (0)  -1.68 (0)         -1.90 (0)   
 
       Panel data test                                                             
                                                               Unadjusted Data                           
                                 1.86     2.04     -0.24               1.56   
                                                               Adjusted data   
                                       2.10                    0.68                0.57       0.35                         
      OECD                                                               Individual tests 
Australia  -2.21   (0)  -2.59 (1)  -2.40    (1)  -3.09    (4)   
Austria  -2.68*  (1)  -1.08 (3)  -0.64    (3)  -3.51** (1)   
Belgium  -0.38   (0)  -2.30 (4)  -2.47    (0)  -3.67** (0)   
Canada  -0.86   (0)  -2.74 (4)  -1.73    (4)  -2.85    (1)   
Denmark  -3.13**(1)  -1.25 (0)  -2.08    (0)  -2.56    (4)   
Spain  -1.91   (0)  -2.78 (1)  -1.59    (0)  -1.82    (0)   
Unites States      -2.75*  (1)  -2.67    (1)   
Finland  -1.68 (0)  -2.72 (4)  -2.71*  (1)  -2.75    (1)   
France  -2.35 (0)  -2.60 (1)  -2.34   (0)  -1.96    (0)   
Greece  -1.38 (0)  -2.70 (1)  -3.34** (1)  -3.29*   (1)   
Iceland  -2.94*(1)  -1.50 (8)  -1.04    (0)  -1.41    (0)   
Ireland  -2.65*(1)  -2.86 (1)  -0.35    (3)  -3.03    (4)   
Italy  -1.94 (0)  -2.02 (2)  -3.13** (1)  -4.84***(3)   
Japan      -1.37    (0)  -3.39*   (3)   
Luxemburg  -2.95**(1)  -1.48    (0)  -2.27    (2)  -2.09     (0)   
N. Zealand  -3.24**(1)  -3.47*   (4)  -3.76** (2)  -4.05**  (1)   
Holland  -1.42   (0)  -2.94    (1)  -1.43    (1)  -2.87     (2)   
Norway  -2.02   (2)  -3.06    (4)  -2.74*   (0)  -2.95     (1)   
Portugal  -2.02   (1)  -2.33    (1)  -1.79     (3)  -1.81     (5)   
United Kingdom  -2.84*  (1)  -1.34    (0)  -1.62     (1)  -1.51     (1)   
Sweden  -3.36**(4)  -4.28***(2)  -0.69     (4)  -5.10***(2)   
Switzerland  -1.26   (2)  -2.40    (1)  -0.27     (4)  -1.60    (4)   
Panel data test 
                                                                Unadjusted Data   
            -3.30                -0.83           -1.25  -3.69                        
                                                               Adjusted data   
  -3.30 -0.83  -3.45  -3.18   
      PECO                                                Individual tests l                                                                                                    
Bulgaria      -0.38      -2.56     
Croatia      -0.61      -3.59     
Czech Republic       -0.77      -2.94     
Estonia       0.95      -2.94     
Hungary       -1.49      -1.90     
Latvia      -2.11      -2.04     
Lithuania      -1.32      -2.27     
Poland      -1.32      -1.71     
Romania      -1.97      -1.11     
Russia      -1.85      -1.27     
Slovakia       -1.44      -1.87     
Slovenia      -1.52      -1.85    
                                                                        Panel data test                                                           
                                                     Unadjusted Data  
  -1.43 2.32     
                                                          Adjusted data   
   -1.63 1.33     
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B) Tests of the weak PPP  
 
Table 2 : Panel data unit-root test 
               Adjusted data                                   Unadjusted Data 
Country  Constant  Constant + trend  Constant  Constant + trend 
    Nominal exchange rate    
Africa -0.18  0.68  -0.18  0.68 
Latin America  0.19  1.14  0.19  1.14 
Asia 3.19  0.45  1.1  0.12 
Mena 5.71  0.64  1.1  0.71 
PECO 
OECD 
0.34 
-0.17 
1.76 
0.81 
0.54 
-0.17 
0.86 
0.81 
Price ratio 
Africa 0.59  5.14  0.53  3.81 
Latin America  3.34  5.49  0.86  -0.98 
Asia 5.13  0.45  1.1  -0.43 
Mena 1.44  6.03  0.91  0.65 
PECO 
OECD 
2.01 
1.36 
1.23 
0.22 
0.43 
-0.46 
019 
1.85 
 
Table 3 : Cointegration test between the nominal exchange rate and the price ratio 
     αι β ι  t-stat   Number of lags 
                                                            Developed countries  
Australia   -0.96  0.66 3.48  1 
Austria   -0.92  0.74  7.15  1 
Belgium   -0.37 1.39 10.57  2 
Canada     1.37 0.91  52.82  0 
Denmark   -1.18  0.96  4.05  0 
Spain   -0.77  1.09  36.53  1 
Finland     1.08  0.21  2.52  0 
France     0.03  1.30  43.59  3 
Greece   -0.29  1.23  30.68  0 
Iceland     2.16  0.69  5.85  1 
Ireland     0.50  0.99  26.07  1 
Italy                                                  -0.79   0.4  2.61  0 
Luxemburg   -0.42  1.21  21.76  1 
New-Zealand   -0.17  0.78  10.27  1 
Holland     0.50  1.06  24.27  3 
Norway   -0.24  1.41  28.33  0 
Portugal     0.77  0.97  14.90  0 
United Kingdom      -0.21  1.34  30.63  1 
Sweden     -1.23  0.45  6.06  1 
Switzerland   1.08    3.26  3.30  1 
                                     Panel-stat        Group-stat                                                       
v-stat                             1.343          
rho-stat -0.639  -0.897       
pp-stat -1.563  -2.477      
Ad-fstat -2.802  -4.386    
                                                                  Latin America    
Argentina       0.75   0.99              36.28        0 
Bolivia                                                   -0.76    1.04              9.81       0 
Chile                                                      0.63     1.03              52.48               3 
Colombia                                               -0.59     1.28              9.31               0 
Costa Rica                                             -0.72     1.00              8.66                            0 
Ecuador                                           -1.55     1.00              13.36               2 
Guatemala                                             -1.40     0.96              9.82               0 
Guyana                                           -0.86     0.98             14.09               0 
Honduras                                            1.03     1.13             4.79               2 
Mexico                                             1.49     1.03             5.45               0 
Nicaragua                                            1.90     1.03             31.39               2 
Panama                                            0.46     0.34             10.60               2 
Paraguay                                            1.77     1.02             4.82               0 
Peru                                                    -1.77     0.88             12.98               0 
Uruguay                                          -0.63     0.79             27.83               0 
Venezuela                                              0.77     0.97             5.57               0 
                                      Panel-stat       Group-stat      
v-stat                  3.77         
rho-stat          -1.548            -0.379      
pp-stat                  -1.604            -1.356      
adf-stat          -2.094            -1.571       
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                                                         Asia     
Korea                                               1.37  0.65              6.46               1 
Hong Kong                                            -0.66  0.008            0.06               1 
India                                              -0.13  1.93              8.53               1 
Indonesia                                              1.77  1.65              13.80               1 
Japan                                               9.43  2.1                21.41               1 
Malaysia                                              -1.16  0.77              17.51               1 
The Philippines                                    -0.12  0.92              13.05               3 
Singapore                       -1.39  1.34              32.08               1 
Thailand                                             -0.15  1.05               8.60               3 
                Panel-stat          Group-stat       
v-stat                                            2.397         
rho-stat                                     1.113                0.589      
pp-stat                   0.939                 0.253       
Adf-stat                   0.784                 0.610  
                                                             Africa     
Botswana                                              -1.44  1.09              13.31               3 
Burundi                           0.53  0.80              16.35                         4 
Gambia                            0.68  1.18              10.63               1 
Ghana                          -0.92  1.05              11.4                 3 
Kenya                            1.30  3.42              11.34               2 
Malawi                          -0.16  1.14              11.41               0 
Niger                           -0.78  1.46                5.05               0 
Uganda                           -0.56  0.50                1.39               0 
RCA                             0.72  0.58              15.76               3 
Sierra Leone                     1.08  1.72              14.54               1 
Tanzania                           0.92  2.63                7.96               0 
Zimbabwe                          1.10  1.10              21.03               2 
Zambia                           -2.10  4.99                4.14               1 
                                                  Panel-stat          Group-stat                                l 
v-stat                            0.958          
rho-stat              -0.052                 -0.79      
pp-stat                       -0.43                -1.101       
adf-stat              -1.291                -1.368       
                                                                       MENA                                                                
Algeria                        0.25  1.22                 6.05               0 
Egypt                           -0.63  0.33                 0.41               0 
Jordan                                                    -1.34  0.96                18.06               0 
Morocco                           0.11  0.16                  0.20               0 
Tunisia                           -0.95  0.48                 12.91               1 
Turkey                                                      2.19  1.19                   8.37               0 
                Panel-stat            Group-
stat 
v-stat                                              1.966          
rho-stat                 -1.067  -0.56       
pp-stat                                          -1.138    -3.54       
adf-stat                  -2.421  -3.21       
                                                                                         PECO 
Bulgaria                          0.08  1.5                    28.51               0 
Croatia                                              -0.07  1.49                  12.16               0 
Czech Republic                                                0.07  7.25                  17.78               0 
Estonia                                                   0.045  1.44                  36.83               0 
Hungary                           0.01  2.97                  26.97               1 
Latvia                                                     -0.15  2.96                  12.50               2 
Lithuania                          0.06  2.35                  13.83               0 
Poland                                                     -0.13  2.68                  12.17               2 
Rumania                          0.98  0.70                  10.81               1 
Russia                                                      0.64  1.55                    7.72               2 
Slovakia                         0.66  1.43                   15.31               2 
Slovenia                         -0.23  7.51                     8.12               1 
              Panel-stat         Group-stat    
v-stat                        1.547          
rho-stat             -0.62               -1.124      
pp-stat                         -0.278               -1.420      
adf-stat             -1.510               -1.203      
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2. PPP, exchange rate regime and inflation (Pedroni, 2001) 
 
Country 
Constant 
 
ADF-stat
6 
Constante + trend 
 
ADF-stat 
    
Australia     -2.71        (0)  -1.52          (4) 
Austria       0.23         (0)  -1.87          (0) 
Belgium     -0.08          (0)  -1.78           (0) 
Benin     -1.12         (0)  -2.56          (0) 
Burkina Faso       0.11         (4)  -3.11          (2) 
Cameroon     -1.45         (0)  -2.13           (0) 
Canada     -2.21         (0)  -2.45           (3) 
Denmark      0.33           (0)  -1.78          (0) 
Spain       0.34         (4)                              -1.85          (1) 
Finland     -1.18         (0)  -2.09           (0) 
France      0.46         (0)  -1.66           (0) 
Gabon     -1.73         (3)  -2.47          (0) 
Hong-Kong     -2.80         (4)  -2.69           (1) 
India     -1.05         (0)  -2.60           (0) 
Ireland     -0.18          (0)  -1.69           (0) 
Italy     -0.83          (2)  -1.30           (0) 
Japan       0.36        (4)  -1.93           (4) 
Jordan     -0.95         (4)  -3.10          (1) 
Luxemburg     -0.04          (0)  -1.69           (0) 
Malaysia     -2.68         (1)  -3.31           (2) 
Mali     -1.40         (0)  -2.65           (0) 
Morocco     -1.52          (0)  -2.14          (1) 
Niger       0.16         (0)  -2.74           (0) 
Norway      0.57           (4)  -2.47          (0) 
Paraguay     -3.37         (3)  -1.99           (0) 
Holland    -0.42          (0)  -2.17           (0) 
R. C.A     -2.75         (3)  -2.38           (0) 
R. Congo    -0.60         (1)   -1.78           (0) 
United Kingdom     -3.85          (3)  -0.95           (3) 
Senegal     -1.64         (0)  -2.48          (0) 
Singapore    -1.99         (1)  -2.36           (2) 
Sweden     -1.36          (0)  -1.73           (0) 
Tunisia    -2.46         (1)  -1.84           (0) 
Australia     -1.78         (2)  -2.26          (1) 
Group-ADF-stat     2.60                                              -4.31 
 
                                                    
 Table. 4 : Stationarity tests of the TCR for countries with high inflation (Pedroni, 2001) 
Country 
     Constant                                Constant  +  trend 
 
    
Argentina  -1.73   (0)  -2.37    (0) 
Bolivia  -1.77    (0)  -1.75    (0)   
Chile  -2.39    (1)  -2.08    (0)   
Colombia  -2.26    (1)  -2.22    (1)   
Costa Rica  -1.72    (0)  -2.30    (0)   
Egypt  -1.94    (1)  -2.76    (1)   
                                                 
6 The number of lags is given in brackets.  
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El Salvador  -1.74    (0)  -1.34    (0)   
Ecuador  -3.26    (2)  -2.02    (2)   
Greece  -1.55    (0)  -1.14    (0)   
Guatemala  -1.56    (0)  -2.03    (0)   
Iceland  -2.40    (0)  -2.09    (1)   
Mexico  -1.61    (2)  -3.00    (0)   
Peru  -0.38    (0)  -0.42    (0)   
Portugal  -2.61    (1)  -0.94    (1)   
Switzerland  -1.91    (0)  -1.86    (0)   
Turkey  -1.53    (0)  -2.12    (0)   
Uruguay  -1.03    (0)  -1.31    (0))   
Venezuela  -1.20    (0)  -2.14    (0)   
Group-ADF-stat              -1.51       -1.72 
 
 
Table. 5  : Stationarity tests of the TCR for countries with fixed exchange rate regime 
  Constant  Constant + trend 
Chile   -1.62   (0)  -1.08   (0) 
Colombia  1.60    (0)  -2.06    (1) 
Costa Rica  0.91    (0)  -0.65    (0) 
Ecuador  -1.38    (1)  -1.75    (0) 
Egypt  -1.61    (0)  -0.81    (0) 
Guatemala  -0.54    (1)  -1.48    (0) 
Honduras  2.57    (0)  -1.54    (0) 
India  -0.43    (0)  1.42    (0) 
Jordan  0.51    (0)  -0.18    (0) 
Nicaragua  -1.41    (0)  -1.47    (0) 
Paraguay  1.34    (0)  -1.55    (0) 
The Philippines  -0.10    (0)  -0.48    (0) 
Thailand  0.40    (0)  -1.55    (0) 
Turkey  -1.08    (0)  -1.48    (0) 
Uruguay  -0.66    (0)  -1.17    (0) 
Zambia  0.41    (0)  -2.94    (1) 
 
Group-ADF-stat                 6.98                                                   -1.23 
 
 
Table. 6 : Stationarity tests of the TCR for countries with floating exchange rate regime 
  Constant    Constant + trend  A
aAustralia    -3.28   ( 0)                9.00    (0)   
Austria  -2.71   ( 1)  9.09    (0) 
Belgium  -1.91   ( 1)  9.14    (0) 
Canada  -7.65   ( 2)  9.08    (0) 
Colombia  -1.87   ( 0)  9.12    (0) 
Chile  -1.95   ( 0)  9.17    (0) 
Denmark  1.40    (2)  9.09    (0) 
Ecuador  -1.47    (0)  7.67    (0) 
Spain  -1.95    (0)  9.09    (0) 
Finland  -1.66    (0)  6.85    (0) 
France  -3.66    (1)  9.08    (0) 
Greece  -1.81    (1)  9.42    (0) 
Guatemala  -0.38    (0)  9.08    (0) 
Honduras  -0.95    (0)  7.77    (0) 
India  -2.13    (2)  9.25    (0) 
Ireland  -1.90    (0)  9.17    (0) 
Iceland  9.75    (0)  9.77    (0)  
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Italy  -3.03    (0)  4.18    (2) 
Japan  -2.33    (0)  9.10    (0) 
Luxemburg  -1.81    (0)  9.37    (0) 
Morocco  -7.05    (2)  3.78    (2) 
New. Zealand  -2.30    (1)  2.05    (0) 
Norway  -2.04    (0)  9.08    (0) 
Paraguay  -1.83    (0)  9.08    (0) 
Holland  -1.75    (0)  9.10    (0) 
Peru  -2.94    (1)  9.10    (0) 
Portugal  -6.73    (2)  9.07    (0) 
R. C.A  -2.82    (1)  9.08    (0) 
United Kingdom  -2.81    (1)  9.10    (0) 
Sweden  -7.55    (2)  9.09    (0) 
Switzerland  1.53    (0)  9.08    (0) 
Thailand  -2.06    (0)  9.51    (0) 
Tunisia  -3.04    (0)  9.09    (0) 
Turkey  -0.70    (0)  9.10    (0) 
Uruguay  -5.57    (2)  9.18    (0) 
 
Group-ADF-stat            -5.03              70.59 
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Appendix 2 : Procedure of country classification according to the exchange rate regime 
 
Table. 8 : Evolution of exchange rate regimes 
    1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
ALGERIA  fx  fx  nd  nd  i f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
ARGENTINA  nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd fx  f  f  fx  fx  fx fx fx fx fx 
BOLIVIA  nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd fx  f  f  i  nd  f  f  f  f  f  f  i  f  f  f 
BOTSAWANA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx  i  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx  i 
BURANDI  fx  fx f fx  fx  fx  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  f  f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
CHILE  fx fx fx fx fx fx nd  nd fx fx fx fx fx  i  f f f i f i f f f i f i i f 
COLOMMBIA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  f  fx  fx  i i i i i f f f f f 
KOREA  fi fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  f  i  fx fx i  i  f  i fx  fx i  i  i fx i  i  i  f  f 
COTA  RICA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx fx fx 
EGYPT  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  f  f  f  fx fx  i  fx fx fx fx 
ECUADOR fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx  i i i i f i f f f f f 
GAMBIA  fx  i i i i i i i i i i i f f f f f f f f f f f f i f i f 
GANA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx fx  i  fx fx fx fx  fx  fx  i i i i i i 
GUATUMALA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx  i f f i f f f f f f f 
GUYANA  i i I i i  fx  fx  fx fx fx  i  fx fx  f  f  i  fx  fx  fx  f f f f f f f f f 
HONDORAS  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx  fx  fx  f i i f f f f f f 
INDIA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx 
INDONISIA fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx fx fx fx  i  i  i  i  fx  i  fx fx  i  i  i  i  i  i  f  f 
JORDAN  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx fx fx fx fx  fx i  i  i  i  i fx  fx i fx i  i fx  fx  fx 
KENYA  fx  fx  I i  fx  i i f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
MALAWI  fx i  i fx  fx  fx  fx fx fx fx fx  i i i i i f f i i i f f f i  fx  f f 
MALAYSIA i i f f i i i f i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i f f 
MOROCCO  fx  fx  i i i i i f f f f f f f f i f f f f f f f f f f f f 
MEXICO  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  i i i i f  fx  i i  fx  fx  fx  f f f f f 
NICARAGUA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
NIGERIA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  fx  fx  fx  fx  i i i i i i i i  fx  i i i i  fx  fx  i  fx 
UGANDA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  fx  fx  fx  nd  nd  nd  i i i i i i 
PARAGUAY  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i i  fx  fx  f i i i i i i i i f 
PHILIPPINES  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx nd  nd  nd fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx 
COSTA-RICA  fx  fx  fx  fx  fx  fx  fx  i  fx  fx  i i i i i i i i i  fx  i i i i i i i i 
SINGAPORE  i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i  fx  i i  
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SIRALEONE  fx  i i  fx  i i i i i i i f f  fx  f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
TANZANIA fx fx fx fx fx  f  f  f  f  i  f f f f f f f f f  fx  fx  nd  f f f f f f 
THAILAND fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx 
TUNISIA  fx  fx  i i i i  fx  fx  fx  i i i i i i i i i i  fx  i i i i i i i i 
TURKEY  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx 
URUGUAY fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i i i i f f f f f f f f f f 
ZAMBABWE  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  i  f  i  i  i  i  i  i  f  i  f  f  i  f  f nd 
ZAMBIA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  fx i fx i 
Note: nd means indefinite regime, fx means fixed regime, i means intermediate regime and f means flexible regime 
 
From the previous classification we define two exchange rate regimes : a regime of fixed exchange rate and a regime of floating exchange rate. The exchange rate regime is 
supposed to be fixed when nominal exchange rate is maintained constant and when the exchange reserves strongly vary. The floating exchange rate regime is characterized by 
a significant variation of the nominal exchange rate and a relative stability of the exchange reserves : thus it includes countries with floating and intermediate exchange rate 
regime. Finally, the countries characterized by a nominal exchange rate stability and of the exchange reserves are excluded from the sample. In fact, the exchange rate 
regimes will only have an influence when the variables characterizing them behave differently. In other words, the fact of taking into account countries for which nominal 
exchange rate and exchange reserves are stable could biased econometric results towards the absence of a significant effect of the exchange rate regimes. 
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